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SOUTH CAROLINA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
BoqD IssuEs
Mims v. MeNair' is one of a long series of cases testing the
constitutionality of state bond issues without popular referen-
dum, but the arguments disclosed a significant extension of the
Special Fund Doctrine used to validate earlier bond issues. The
plaintiffs sought to enjoin the issuance of State Capital Improve-
ment Bonds pursuant to 1968 legislation2 which purported to
authorize the issuance of bonds in an amount not exceeding
$70,000,000 and pledged to the payment thereof the revenues
from the state income tax.3 The constitutional basis of the tax-
payers' position was that the Act violated article X, section 11,
of the South Carolina Constitution, which prohibits the creation
of any debt by the state unless the question of the creation there-
of is first submitted to the qualified electors of the state at a
general election and approved by two-thirds of those voting. The
supreme court, in affirming, adopted and set forth in ful Judge
Grimball's decree below in favor of the validity of the Act.
The General Assembly has since the fortunate decision in State
ex rel Richards v. Moorer4 some forty years ago employed, with
the blessings of the court, the Special Fund Doctrine to sidestep
the restrictions placed on it by frugal Ben Tillman in 1895. Ac-
cording to the court:
It is now well settled that the General Assembly may
[authorize bonds without referendum] where suc, obli-
gations are secured by the pledge of a fund established
or set aside which is reasonably sufficient to pay such
obligations without resorting to the levy of a property
tax.5
The major contest arose when the taxpayers asserted some five
reasons why the Special Fund Doctrine could not apply to the
1968 Act. The Court firmly rejected each argument. Yes, there
was a "fund set aside" -the pledge of future income tax rev-
1. 165 S.E.2d 355 (S.C. 1969).
2. LV S.C. STATS. AT LARGE 3175 (No. 1377, 1968), relating to student and
faculty revenue bonds for South Carolina State College and bonds for the
TriCentennial Project.
3. Title 65, Chapter 5, S.C. CODE ANN. (1962).
4. 152 S.C. 455, 150 S.E. 269 (1929).
5. Mims v. McNair, 165 S.E.2d 355, 359 (S.C. 1969), quothig Arthur v.
Byrnes, 224 S.C. 51, 57, 77 S.E.2d 311, 313 (1953) (emphasis added).
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enues was sufficient. Yes, it was permissible to issue additional
bonds hereafter -this was upheld for highway bonds6 and for
school bonds.7 Yes, the fund was "reasonably sufficient" as long
as the revenues pledged were in one year 150% of the maximum
annual principal and interest requirements for the next year of
all the bonds to which the revenues were pledged-this 150%
coverage was declared adequate in the same highway and school
bond cases. Yes, the revenues from the income tax would fluc-
tuate with business conditions-but this fluctuation also occurs
with the state retail sales tax involved in the school bond case.
Yes, on the most significant, new question, the pledge of the
revenues for the new bonds was subordinate to a prior pledge of
all these revenues to the State Port Bonds8 - but only the overall
sufficiency of the revenues was material. Though the question of
the priority of the pledges had never been raised before, in
Rio7ards, the original Special Fund Doctrine decision, the
pledge was a subordinate pledge. Herein lies the significance of
the decision. Gone is the necessity for a "special fund" in any
real sense. Only revenue potential adequate to cover principal
and interest payments is required. Although this may well be the
wisest course in the oft-charted but still uncertain waters of
public debt flotation, it is a long step away from the concept of
a "fund set aside".9
In Holland v. Kilgo'0 the supreme court affirmed a declara-
tory judgment denying an injunction on the issuance of $2,800,000
worth of general obligation bonds of School District #5 of Lex-
ington and Richland Counties. This unique school district was
organized in 1952 by the county boards of education in the two
counties and includes land in both. Article X, section 5, of the
Constitution set as a limitation for bond issues eight percent of
the assessed value of all taxable property in the school district.
A 1969 amendment 1 purported to raise the limitation to thirty
percent, but referred to the school district variously as "School
District #6 of Lexington County and School District #6 of
Richland County" and "the districts". The court held that
6. State ex rel Richards v. Moorer, supra note 4.
7. State ex rel Roddy v. Byrnes, 219 S.C. 485, 66 S.E.2d 33 (1951).
8. The income tax pledged in 1956 to the payment of the oustanding
$13,700,000 worth of State Port Bonds upon which the annual debt service
is less than $1,700,000.
9. The Special Fund Doctrine itself seems a long step away from the
concept of article X, section 11.
10. 168 S.E.2d 569 (S.C. 1969).
11. R3, Jan. 28, 1969. The limit had been raised several times prior to 1969.
[Vol. 21
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neither the use of the plural word districts nor the reference to
the older districts barred the success of the attempted amend-
ment.
On the authority of Tindall v. Byars12 the court stated general-
ly that constitutional amendments should be interpreted to effect
the purpose for which they are obviously intended. The obvious
purpose was to liberalize the debt limitation for the people in a
certain area. Use of the older district titles was sufficient to
identify the area. The court also relied on Tindall in dealing
with the misuse of the plural form. The older case upheld crea-
tion of a single county-wide school district under an amendment
enabling the Chester County Board of Education to prescribe the
area of county school districts.
The court also approved submission of the amendment only to
the voters in the two counties, without a vote by the statewide
electorate. Article XVI, section 1, of the constitution instructs
that:
A proposed amendment providing for a change in the
bonded debt limitation of a county or any of its political
subdivisions shall be voted on only by the qualified elec-
tors of such county.
School District #5 is not a political subdivision of a single coun-
ty. But on the authority of Mungo '. Schedd13 the court divided
the district into two portions and considered each part a political
subdivision of the respective counties.
TAXATION
In United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. ColuMWia 1 4 four
insurance companies sought partial refunds of monies paid to Co-
lumbia as business license fees. Prior to 1965, S.C. CODE, ANN.
§ 47-407 (1962) limited business and professional license fees in
cities of 70,000 people or more to a $2500 maximum fee.1r In
1965 the General Assembly amended the section to exclude cities
of 90,000 people or more. "The single effect of this amendment
12. 217 S.C. 1, 59 S.E.2d 337 (1950).
13. 247 S.C. 195, 146 S.E.2d 617 (1966). The court used the rationale out-
lined in the text to sustain a bonded indebtedness of 15% in this same district,
over the 8% limit set in 1895, but under the 20% limit in Lexington and match-
ing the 15% limit in Richland.
14. 165 S.E.2d 272 (S.C. 1969).
15. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 47-173 and 47-271 provide for assessment of busi-
ness taxes by towns with under 1000 and over 1000 people respectively -
without specific limitation. Both sections do require, however, any taxes levied
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was to allow the City of Columbia to remove the maximum limit-
ation, ... [since] [aidmittedly the only city in South Carolina
having more than 90,000 inhabitants according to the latest
United States census was Columbia.' 16 In 1966 Columbia enacted
a license tax of two percent of gross premiums for casualty and
fire insurers. The plaintiffs were assessed fees from seven thou-
sand to twelve thousand dollars each in 1966.17
The South Carolina Supreme Court held that the 1965 amend-
ment was "special legislation" in violation of article III, section
34, subsection ix, of the South Carolina Constitution, and thus
the ordinance was subject to the former $2500 limit. Subsection
ix prohibits enactment of local or special laws where a general
law can be made applicable. Columbia conceded that a general
law could be made applicable, but contended without success that
the amendment was also such a general law. The court disagreed,
reaffirming the long-standing principles, first that a law general
in form but special in operation is unconstitutional, and second
that the legislature cannot escape the constitutional proscription
by creating an arbitrary classification.'
The classification as it stood before 1965 was upheld in Glens
Falls Imsurance Co. v. Columbia.9 The legislature presumably
intended to prohibit the imposition of an unreasonable or un-
conscionable tax. In the words of the court in 1963, "Since the
assessment of the tax was graduated as to income, the payment
of an unreasonable license tax in cities of smaller population was
no doubt considered unlikely.120 The line of demarcation at 70,-
000 people is within the discretion of the legislature.2 1 But there
is no reason for putting cities with over 90,000 people in a dif-
16. United States Fidelity & Guar. Company v. Columbia, 165 S.E.2d 272,
273 (S.C. 1969).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 275.
19. 242 S.C. 237, 130 S.E.2d 573 (1963). In Glens Falls Columbia attacked
the demarcation as "special legislation," since smaller cities had no specific
limitation; see note 2 supra. The court said:
The limit of judicial inquiry in a case of this kind is whether the
classification on the basis of population "bears any reasonable rela-
tion to the subject .... Unless the classification . . . is plainly
illusory or may be applied illusively, the judgment of the legisla-
ture must prevail." Id. at 244-45, 130 S.E.2d at 577 (citations
omitted).
Brailsford, J., concurred on the grounds that the constitutional point had not
been properly raised, but expressed "grave doubt" as to the reasonableness of
the demarcation.
20. Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Columbia, 242 S.C. 237, 245, 130 S.E.2d 573, 577
(1963).
21. The taxation scheme is subject to criticism. What is reasonable is not
determined solely by the amount of the tax, but by the amount in proportion
[Vol. 21
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ferent class from cities between 70,000 and 90,000. In fact, the
amendment is entirely inconsistent with the original legislative
intent as identified by the court: levies over $2500 are most likely
in the largest cities.
AmmNIaw-Ts
The Amendment Process.
Heretofore, article XVI, sections 1 and 2, which in practice
govern amendment of the South Carolina Constitution, have re-
quired that amendments be individually considered and pro-
cessed.22 As a prelude to the introduction of the proposals of the
Constitution Study Committee23 and possible recommendation of
those proposals to the people, the General Assembly has moved
to alter this requirement. Section 1 has been amended to provide
for, in the general elections of 1970 and 1972 only,
revision of an entire article or the addition of a new art-
icle . . . as a single amendment with only one question
being required to be submitted to the electors. Such
amendment may delete, revise and transpose provisions
from other articles of the Constitution provided such
provisions are germane to the subject matter of the arti-
cle being revised or being proposed.
24
As noted above, formerly amendment had in effect to be sec-
tion by section, if the referendum procedure were used.2 5 Other-
wise resort to constitutional convention2 6 was necessary. Such
to, e.g., the amount of premiums, of profits, of business. A legislature opposed
to unreasonable taxes should be more concerned with small cities with license
fees over $2,500 than large cities.
In the United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Greenville, 250 S.C. 136, 156
S.E.2d 417 (1967), two insurers sought refunds from Greenville, a city under
70,000 and subject to § 47-371, not § 47-407. Plaintiffs contended that imposi-
tion of a license tax over $2,500 was excessive and unreasonable in violation
of the legislative intent as reflected in § 47407. The court refused to read in a
limitation that the law did not expressly contain.
22. The procedure is for the proposal to be affirmed by two-thirds vote
in each chamber of the legislature, then to get majority support at a statewide
general election referendum, and then to be ratified by two-thirds of each
chamber. A 1967 amendment requires only a county wide referendum when
the question is the bonded debt limitation for one county.
23. The committee was formed in 1966 and is composed of the Lieutenant
Governor, three senators, four representatives and four gubernatorial appointees.
24. R61, March 5, 1969.
25. Article XVI, section 2 requires a ballot in such form "that the
electors shall vote for or against each of such amendments separately."
Section 2 was not specifically amended, probably because its very terms would
require two amendments. However, it has very likely been amended by impli-
cation.
26. Article XVI, section 3 provides that the legislature and the people can
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cumbersome machinery undoubtedly served the purposes of cer-
tain interests. 27 However, the degree to which the new procedure
will facilitate badly needed constitutional revision should be ob-
vious and welcome.
Divorce.
By virtue of an amendment to article XVII, section 3,28 and
the implementing statute,29 "continuous separation for a period
of at least three years" became the fifth ground for divorce in
South Carolina. This is a bold step for this historically conserva-
tive jurisdiction. The four existing grounds- adultery, deser-
tion for a period of one year, physical cruelty, and habitual
drunkenness caused by alcohol or by narcotics-have been per-
mitted only since 1949.30 Before that date there had never been
legal divorce in the state except for a six-year period during Re-
construction.3 1  This is indeed a bold step: the new provision
allows divorce by mere consent of the parties, while in the past
only serious misconduct by one partner could justify dissolution
of the marital bond.3 2
Addiction.
Diversion of liquor tax revenues from school purposes to the
treatment and rehabilitation of alcohol and drug addicts may
occur in the future. An amendment 3 to article XI, section 12,
which deals with education, provides that with respect to any in-
crease in license fees and taxes after July 1, 1969, all or any por-
tion of the additional revenue may be applied to such purposes.
The section now provides that funds remaining after statutory
appropriations to the counties may go for state school purposes.
CLincH HEYXWARD BwsEps, JR.
27. In Moffett v. Traxler, 247 S.C. 298, 305, 147 S.E.2d 255, 259 (1966),
the court indicated that the purpose of the several provisions is to "provide
every safeguard against log rolling, surprise, and fraud in the adoption of
constitutional amendments ......
28. R116, March 5, 1969.
29. R258, May 2, 1969.
30. In 1949, Article XVII, § 3 was amended to allow divorce on these four
basic grounds, though without specifying the period of desertion or the two
causes of drunkenness. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-101 (1962) now controls.
31. Stunner, The South Carolina Divorce Act of 1949, 3 S.C.L.Q. 253,
253-59 (1951). This excellent short article indicates that Article XIV, § 5 of
the Constitution of 1868 permitted divorce "as shall be prescribed by law."
A statute establishing the grounds of adultery and desertion for two years
was enacted in 1872 but repealed in 1878. In 1895 the new constitution pro-
hibited all divorce.
32. See the Survey of Domestic Relations in this issue.
33. Rl15, March 5, 1969.
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